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WITH WHITE GLOVES: EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE GAMING
INDUSTRY
Eric Beal 

I. INTRODUCTION
The Framers drafted the Constitution with the clear belief that feudalism
was “incompatible with a republican form of government.”1 In fact, John Adams
once described Americans as in “direct opposition” to feudalism. 2 George Mason
began the Virginia Declaration of Rights by describing the right to acquire and
possess private property as an inherent natural right which cannot be infringed.3
Alexander Hamilton described the “security of Property” as “one of the greatest
objects of Government.”4 James Madison once wrote that a just government
“impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”5 Sir William
Blackstone, one of the most influential legal commentators in world history,
described “the law of the land” as “postpon[ing] even public necessity to the
sacred and inviolable rights of private property.”6 These principles inspired
James Madison to maintain “the inviolability of property” in the Constitution.7
Consequently, the Takings Clause enshrined in the Bill of Rights intended to
limit the government’s power to acquire private land, expressly stating, “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”8
Given the Framers’ intent and the country’s emphasis on individual
rights, property rights would seemingly be recognized as a fundamental right and
awarded the highest level of judicial protection. Surprisingly, they are not a
*
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Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 394 (2006).
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John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, BOS. GAZETTE (Aug.
12, 1765).
3
VA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
4
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 302 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
5
Id. at 505. (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT. GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 1792)).
6
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
134–135 (1765)) (emphasis added).
7
Madison, supra note 5.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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fundamental right, and exercises of eminent domain are awarded only the lowest
level of judicial scrutiny, rational basis review. While the Constitution purports
to shield property rights, judicial decisions have destroyed protections for
property with regards to eminent domain. Over the years, the definition of public
use expanded to the point where “any property may be forcibly taken for any
purpose deemed by redevelopers to be more lucrative than the existing one.” 9
The Supreme Court replaced public use with public purpose, which has been
further redefined as public benefit and “has now become a primary vehicle for
transferring property rights and ownership from one private owner to another.”10
For economic redevelopment, private interests often use eminent
domain as a “tool of first resort.”11 For example, the casino gaming industry is
uniquely susceptible to “private to private” takings, as many state statutes
expressly find that economic development of the industry is for public use,
purpose, or benefit.12 This Note begins with a brief history of the exercise of
eminent domain for Las Vegas, Nevada casino resort properties, then discusses
the expansion of the power with the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision, the
citizenry’s backlash, and the states’ responses, or lack thereof, to this decision.
Next, the Note discusses the issues eminent domain raises for the unique gaming
industry. Finally, this Note presents solutions to the issue presented by Kelo and
its progeny. Although private takings serve as an enticing and increasingly broad
tool of first resort for casino projects with promises of economic development,
they impose a significant social cost, are antithetical to the principles of this
Nation, and often create economic waste rather than spurring development.

II. EMINENT DOMAN AND LAS VEGAS CASINOS
Carol Pappas fled to America from Nazi occupation in Greece during
World War II.13 Carol’s husband ran the White Spot restaurant in downtown Las
Vegas.14 The City of Las Vegas targeted the Pappas property for construction of
the Fremont Street Experience parking garage and exercised eminent domain to
seize their property.15 Carol Pappas fought this taking in the Nevada court system

Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory
Fluff”?, 33. PEPP. L. REV. 335, 365 (2006). See also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
10
Edward J. Lopez et. al., Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast: State Legislative Responses
to the Kelo Backlash, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 102 (2009) (citation omitted).
11
Id.
12
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23K, § 1 (2011); 4
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2017); N.J. STAT. § 5:12–1 (2011); 230 ILL. COMP. STAT.
10/2 (2019).
13
Alan Choate, Carol Pappas, Foe of Eminent Domain, Dies, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/carol–pappas–foe–of–
eminent–domain–dies.
14
Id.
15
Id.
9
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for more than ten years.16
The Nevada Legislature “clearly defined” takings of private property for
economic redevelopment as a public purpose.17 The United States Supreme
Court described such a determination to be “well-nigh conclusive.”18 The Las
Vegas City Council created the Las Vegas Redevelopment Agency (“LVRA”)
through Chapter 79 of the Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”), which specifically
identified the elimination of blight as a “public purpose.”19 Conditions
constituting blight include: “increased crime rates and requests for police
assistance, business flight from the downtown area, decline in tourism, lack of
parking, visitor and residents’ perceptions of lack of safety in the area, and
increases in vacant and aging buildings.”20
In 1994, the City asked the LVRA to evaluate downtown and “determine
whether redevelopment was necessary to combat physical, social, or economic
blight.”21 The LVRA concluded a serious physical, social, and economic blight
burdened all of the targeted downtown areas, including the Pappas property.22
They further concluded that a large-scale redevelopment project with the
combined efforts of the City and private sector would be necessary to eliminate
the blight and that simply “working with individuals on a piecemeal basis would
not stem the decline.”23 This project allowed the LVRA to exercise eminent
domain to take private property for “projects designed to eliminate . . . blight.”24
Thus, the City, casinos in the downtown area, and the LVRA conceptualized an
anchor project called the Fremont Street Experience to revitalize the downtown
and eliminate blight.25 This project included a five-story parking garage which
encompassed an entire city block, including the Pappas property.26
Mr. and Mrs. Pappas refused the LVRA’s initial offers for the property
and after negotiations for a lease failed, the LVRA acquired the Pappas property
unopposed via eminent domain in January 1994.27 Thereafter, the Pappases filed
a counterclaim alleging six causes of action, including a procedural due process
violation for the acquisition of their property and a substantive due process
violation for inadequate compensation.28 The district court denied the Pappases’
16

See id.; see also City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas,
76 P.3d 1, 8 (Nev. 2003).
17
Pappas, 76 P.3d at 5.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 5–6.
20
Id. at 6
21
Id.
22
Id. at 6.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 7.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 7–8.
27
Id. at 8.
28
Id.
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motion for a rehearing regarding the taking and, consequently, the LVRA
immediately proceeded to demolish their property and began construction of the
parking garage.29 Ultimately, the district court found the LVRA’s actions
constituted an improper use of eminent domain because, among other reasons,
there were less restrictive alternatives, the LVRA acted in bad faith, and the
taking did not constitute public use.30 However, the Pappas property was already
destroyed.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court analyzed the definition of public
use, a question that has “plagued the American judiciary ever since it arrogated
to itself the [prerogative] of interpreting constitutions.”31 The Pappases argued
that the Nevada Supreme Court should adopt a narrow interpretation of public
use, which would require an actual public project for use by the public at large.32
On the other hand, the LVRA argued for the broader interpretation, which
“includes any ‘use [that] concerns the whole community or promotes the general
interest in its relation to any legitimate object of government.’”33 Nevada’s high
court recognized that the United States Supreme Court adopted the broad
interpretation and rejected any literal public use requirement.34 The court also
recognized that Nevada and other similar jurisdictions traditionally applied the
broader definition.35
Nonetheless, the Pappases argued that even under the broader definition,
the taking did not constitute a public use because the LVRA transferred the
property from one private entity to another.36 The court noted the United States
Supreme Court “soundly rejected” the idea that a private taking automatically
falls outside a constitutional exercise of eminent domain.”37 In Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, the Supreme Court upheld the Hawaiian Legislature’s
exercise of eminent domain, as it was intended to break up a powerful and deeply
rooted land oligopoly.38 Although Hawaii transferred the property from one
private party to another, under the rational basis test, the Court determined the
taking constituted a proper public use and exercise of the state’s police power,
deferring to the state legislature “unless the use be palpably without reasonable

29

Id.
Id. at 9.
31
Id. at 10 (quoting Lake Louise Imp. Ass’n v. Multimedia Cablevision of Oak
Lawn, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 982, 984 (1987)).
32
See id.
33
See id. at 10 (quoting S. California Edison Co. v. Rice, 685 F.2d 354, 356 (9th
Cir. 1982)).
34
Id. (citing Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923); Fallbrook
Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159–62 (1896)).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.; see Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984).
30
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foundation.”39
In the Pappases’ case, the Nevada Legislature declared that blight
constituted a “serious and growing menace” to public health, safety, public
welfare, and property values, in addition to increasing crime.40 In a highly
deferential opinion, Nevada’s high court concluded that if a redevelopment plan
rationally related to blight eradication, then the plan will constitute a public
purpose and implementation of the plan will constitute proper exercise of
eminent domain.41 The Nevada Supreme Court found substantial evidence to
support the rationality of LVRA’s determination that the area suffered from
physical, social, and economic blight, including deterioration of infrastructure,
high crime and unemployment, and loss of tourism.42 Additionally, it did not
matter that the Pappas property was not itself blighted. The court cited the
Supreme Court’s Berman holding that “[p]roperty may of course be taken for
this redevelopment which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending.”43
The reason for this is that redevelopment projects are often conducted on a large
scale, affecting wide swathes of land, rather than on a “piecemeal basis.” 44
Justice Leavitt, writing for the dissent, found that a private taking is, by
definition, not public use, and consequently is unconstitutional and void. 45
Departing from the reasoning in Berman, Justice Leavitt argued that the Pappas
property did not suffer from any blight, did not constitute a slum, and presented
no injurious conditions.46 Thus, LVRA’s stated goal of eradicating blight was
not only illegitimate, but it was not even applicable.47 Furthermore, the
redevelopment statute in question required all noncontiguous targeted areas be
blighted or necessary for eminent domain to be exercised; the LVRA proved only
that the property was desirable, but not that it was necessary or suffered from
blight.48 The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently declined to hear
the case.49 Carol Pappas described the seizure poignantly, “[t]hey have stolen our
property with the point of a bayonet in Greece. Here, they steal it with white
gloves.”50

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Pappas, 76 P.3d at 10–11 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241).
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 14 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)).
Id.
Id. at 17 (Leavitt, J., dissenting).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id., cert. denied, 541 U.S. 912 (2004).
Choate, supra note 13.
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Paul Moldon’s story is similar.51 The City of Las Vegas made an offer
for Moldon’s rental property in 1995 for the construction of the Stratosphere, a
hotel and casino located just north of the Las Vegas Strip.52 Moldon turned down
the offer because he felt it was too low, and the City responded by simply seizing
his property through eminent domain.53 Moldon then lost a challenge to the
eminent domain action.54 The City of Las Vegas compensated Moldon $725,000
in exchange for his property, although a jury later valued the land at $1.5
million.55 Not only did the City undervalue Mr. Moldon’s land, but it placed the
$725,000 into a Clark County trust account, where it siphoned $200,000 in
accrued interest into its own general fund.56 Moldon’s attorney described this as
a “raiding [of] a person’s bank account” and stated “[w]e fought the taking of the
real estate for [ten] years, and now we’ve had to fight the taking of the interest
for three years.”57
Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court held that Moldon possessed a
property interest in the deposit and that the siphoning of the interest in Moldon’s
trust account constituted an unconstitutional taking because it “unduly
burden[ed] the Moldons to singlehandedly benefit the public as a whole.”58 A
healthy man at the beginning of this lengthy battle, Moldon grew frail and
suffered from multiple sclerosis by its conclusion.59

III. A PINK LITTLE HOUSE AND KELO
To better understand eminent domain in the context of the gaming
industry, it is important to examine a landmark Supreme Court eminent domain
case. In 2000, the City of New London, Connecticut, created an extensive
economic redevelopment plan in the Fort Trumbull area for the purpose of
creating jobs, generating tax revenue, revitalizing the economically distressed
downtown New London, and making the waterfront more attractive for
recreational activities.60 New London purchased property from voluntary sellers
51

See Scott Wyland, County Must Repay Trust Account Interest, LAS VEGAS REV.
J. (July 25, 2008), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/county–must–repay–trust–
account–interest.
52
Id.; Erin Neff, City Asks Court to Overturn Ruling Against Eminent Domain, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Sept. 14, 2000), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2000/sep/14/city-askscourt-to-overturn-ruling-against-eminent/.
53
Neff, supra note 52.
54
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Crockett, 34 P.3d 553,
563 n.48 (Nev. 2001).
55
Moldon v. Cnty. of Clark, 188 P.3d 76, 78 (Nev. 2008).
56
Id. at 79 n.2.; Wyland, supra note 51.
57
Wyland, supra note 51.
58
Moldon, 188 P.3d at 81–82.
59
Neff, supra note 52.
60
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474–75 (2005).
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while it exercised its eminent domain power to seize property from the
“unwilling owners.”61 At the time, New London suffered from unemployment at
double the rate of Connecticut and its population shrunk to its lowest number in
nearly a century.62 New London founded the New London Development
Corporation (“NDLC”), a private nonprofit, to effectuate the City’s economic
redevelopment plan.63 The State issued $15.35 million in bonds to support the
NDLC and the creation of the Fort Trumbull State Park.64 Soon after, Pfizer, a
biopharmaceutical company, announced the construction of a $300-million
research facility.65
The NLDC and the owners of fifteen properties were unable to reach an
agreement regarding their property, and the NDLC began the condemnation
process which led to the lawsuit.66 Susette Kelo, a homeowner in the waterfront
district, lived in her “little pink house” for three years before the lawsuit
commenced.67 She invested in home improvements to capitalize on her view of
the Thames river.68 Kelo’s neighbor, Wilhelmina Dery, on the other hand, lived
in her home for her entire life, an impressive eighty-two years before the lawsuit
commenced.69 The NLDC intended for some of the subject land to be used for
research and development office space bordering the proposed Pfizer facility,
and for other land to be used as either parking or retail space.70 There were no
allegations of blight or poor condition; the properties were condemned “only
because they happened to be located in the development area.”71 The petitioners
brought an action alleging that the taking violated the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.72
The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that all of the desired exercises
of eminent domain were constitutional.73 The majority cited the Connecticut
General Statutes, which stated that “a legislative determination that the taking of
land, even developed land, as part of an economic development project is a
‘public use’ and in the ‘public interest.’”74 Furthermore, United States Supreme
Court precedent purportedly supports the majority’s conclusion.75 The

61

Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 475.
67
Id.; Kelo Eminent Domain, INST. JUST., https://ij.org/case/kelo (last visited Apr.
9, 2022).
68
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 475–76.
71
Id. at 475.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 476.
74
Id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 (2021).
75
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476.
62
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Connecticut Supreme Court held that the takings were “reasonably necessary” to
achieve New London’s intended public use and the takings were for “reasonably
foreseeable needs.”76 The takings were “sufficiently definite” and given
“reasonable attention” in the economic redevelopment plan. 77
Once again, a state’s high court applied the rational basis test to review the
deprivation of one’s property rights. In fact, Justice Zarella dissented to this
aspect of the majority’s ruling, arguing for heightened scrutiny and a requirement
for the City to “adduce ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the economic
benefits of the plan would in fact come to pass.”78 Justice Zerella recognized
property rights may rise to the level of a fundamental right and exercises of
eminent domain compelled higher scrutiny due to the “tremendous” social cost
of takings, which includes families being forcibly removed from homes they
have lived in for generations.79
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to finally decide the
issue of whether a taking of property for economic development satisfies the
Fifth Amendment’s requirement of public use.80 The Court prefaced its holding
with two commonly accepted truths.81 First, the government cannot “take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B,
even if A is paid just compensation.”82 Second, a state may transfer property from
one private party to another only if the property’s ultimate use is for the general
public, such as takings for common carriers, for example an airline or railroad. 83
The Court expressly stated that a taking would be unconstitutional if it
were for “the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private
party.”84 The Constitution further forbids a taking if the actual purpose is to
bestow a private benefit, regardless of any public use pretext. 85 The Court found
that the facts in Kelo were distinguishable from the commonly accepted truths
because they were “executed pursuant to a carefully considered development
plan,” there was no evidence of an “illegitimate purpose” on the part of the City,
and the City did not intend to “benefit a particular class of identifiable
individuals.”86 However, the Court noted that the City did not plan to open the
seized land to the public at large and the beneficiaries were not common
carriers.87

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id. at 476–77.
Id. at 477 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 589 (Conn. 2004).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id. (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
Id.
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First, the Court justified its holding by claiming it had long abandoned
any literal public use requirement.88 In Berman, the Court upheld a
redevelopment taking that targeted a blighted area in Washington, D.C., where
most of the housing was “beyond repair.”89 An owner of a targeted local store,
which did not suffer from blight, filed an action and argued that the creation of a
more attractive community did not constitute a valid public use.90 The Supreme
Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Douglas, rejected this
argument, deferring to the local authorities’ finding that a redevelopment plan
must be planned as a whole and that nothing in the Fifth Amendment “stands in
the way” of the use of eminent domain to eliminate blight.91 The Court further
defined public welfare broadly as including “spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary” values.92 Such a subjective and esoteric standard
could encompass any property that a local unelected agency determines could
look more pleasing or be put into “better” use.
Similarly, the Kelo Court cited Midkiff, a case which the Ninth Circuit
earlier described as a “naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take
the property of A and transfer it to B solely for B’s private use and benefit.”93 The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding Hawaii’s intent to eliminate
the “social and economic evils of a land oligopoly” by breaking it up through
eminent domain satisfied public use.94 It did not matter that the government took
the property of A (the land oligopoly) and gave it to B (new owners); the fact that
the taking intended to break up the land oligopoly sufficed to constitute public
use.95
The Court reaffirmed Midkiff and Berman, claiming the cases
emphasized “great respect” to federalism and awarded appropriate deference to
local governments making decisions for their constituent’s needs. 96 The Court
deferred to New London’s determination that even though the subject land did
not suffer from blight, the land was still “sufficiently distressed” to justify
eminent domain intended to revitalize the local economy.97
The Court also rejected the landowners’ argument that economic
development can never constitute public use.98 The Court recognized economic
development as a “traditional and long-accepted function of the government” and
that there is “no principled way of distinguishing economic development from
88

Id. at 479 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
Id. at 480 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
90
Id. at 481; Berman, 328 U.S. at 98.
91
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481; Berman, 348 U.S. at 98.
92
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481; Berman, 348 U.S. at 98.
93
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481–82 (emphasis added) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 235 (1984).
94
Id. at 482 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42).
95
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
96
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482.
97
Id. at 483.
98
Id. at 484.
89
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the other public purposes that [they] have recognized,” such as redeveloping a
blighted area in Berman or breaking up an “artificial deterrent” to Hawaii’s
residential land market in Midkiff.99 The Court completely dropped any public
harm requirement because Ms. Kelo’s property, unlike the properties in Berman
and Midkiff, harmed no one, but could merely be made more productive.
Next, the New London landowners argued the use of eminent domain
impermissibly blurred the distinction between public and private takings.100 The
Court also rejected this argument and found that accomplishment of a public
purpose will sometimes inevitably benefit private individuals.101 In Midkiff, the
seizure of the oligarchs’ land conferred a benefit on Hawaiian citizens who were
previously unable to purchase scarce land.102 In Berman, the Court specifically
rejected the argument that a taking which conferred a benefit onto a private party
violated the Fifth Amendment and recognized that public purpose may be better
realized through private enterprise than public ownership.103
Finally, the Court rejected the idea that public use should be restricted
to forbid “transferring citizen A’s property to citizen B for the sole reason that
citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay more in
taxes.”104 This seemingly contradicts the Court’s own aforementioned accepted
truth, as it was quite clearly a taking of the property of Ms. Kelo for the sole
purpose of transferring it to another private party, but the Court distinguished
this ad hoc and found that a redevelopment plan acts as some sort of superseding
break in the chain between the two private parties.105 The Court also rejected a
heightened level of scrutiny requiring reasonable certainty that the purported
benefits will actually occur, because it would depart from its precedent and
would frustrate economic development plans by tying them up in the courts.106
Perhaps in anticipation of the backlash following Kelo, the Court stated
“empirical debates over the wisdom of takings” do not belong in the courts and
instead are a matter of public debate appropriate for the legislature and states to
decide.107
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested that takings with
only an incidental or pretextual justification of public use should be struck down
under rational basis review.108 Justice Thomas also attacked application of the
rational basis test, noting that it typically involves nontraditional property
interests and that eminent domain is a much more blatant infringement of

99

Id.; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 485–86.
104
Id. at 486–87.
105
See id. at 487.
106
Id. at 487–89.
107
See id. at 489.
108
Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100
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traditional property rights.109 The Court previously characterized traditional
property rights as reflecting the “overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origin of the Republic.” 110
Additionally, Thomas argued, the effects of the unprincipled public purpose test
would disproportionately impact marginalized and poor communities because
they are less likely to put their land to the most efficient and productive use, and
are less politically powerful.111 This is the exact “discrete and insular” minority
that ordinarily warrants a higher standard of judicial scrutiny when implicated. 112
Large urban renewal projects in the mid-twentieth century disproportionately
destroyed minority communities, who made up sixty-three percent of individual
families displaced.113
In a scathing dissent, Justice O’Connor wrote that the Court abandoned
a “long-held, basic limitation on government power” and that all private property
is now vulnerable to being transferred to another private party, so long that there
is economic utility in doing so.114 She cited one of the nation’s earliest property
cases, Chandler v. Bull, in which Justice Chase held that a taking of property A
to give it to private party B amounts to “political heresy, altogether inadmissible
in our free republican government.”115 Justice O’Connor argued the majority’s
ruling did just that because the NLDC was an unelected, private nonprofit with
private appointees, whose stated purpose was unjustifiably vague, and their
taking to make the land more productive was not justifiable, effectively writing
the words “for public use” out of the Takings Clause.116
The facts in Kelo, O’Connor argued, could be distinguished from
Midkiff, a case for which she authored the unanimous opinion, and Berman,
where the takings were necessary to rectify conditions “injurious to the public
health, safety, morals, and welfare.”117 Justice O’Connor argued that the Kelo
taking departed from precedent as it was for purely economic purposes and the
majority improperly extended public use to any taking where there is a
conceivable “secondary benefit” to the public, such as increased tax revenues or
job creation.118 O’Connor argued the majority’s ruling turned the Public Use
Clause into a redundancy which would not stop the government “from replacing
any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm
with a factory.”119 O’Connor felt the majority abdicated their responsibility “to
109

Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)).
111
Id. at 520–21.
112
Id. at 521–22 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152,
n.4 (1938)).
113
Id. at 522 (citation omitted).
114
See id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
115
Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388–89 (1798)).
116
Id. at 494–96.
117
Id. at 498–502.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 503.
110
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enforce properly the Federal Constitution (and a provision meant to curtail state
action, no less)” and that the ruling would benefit “citizens with disproportionate
influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and
firms” while harming the vulnerable.120

IV. A POPULAR REVOLT AND AN ELITIST REACTION
The cruel irony of Kelo is what resulted of Ms. Kelo’s property. Only
four years after the decision, the redevelopment plan fell apart and the
“identifiable beneficiary,” Pfizer, announced that it was closing the $350-million
research center and laying off 1,400 workers without even notifying the City of
New London ahead of time.121 The lot upon which Ms. Kelo’s house once stood
remained vacant until 2014, when it did not become a parking lot or retail space,
but instead became a home to feral cats and otherwise remained unused, along
with the other properties seized.122
Justice Palmer, a member of the Connecticut Supreme Court majority,
personally apologized to Ms. Kelo and told her that he regretted his decision.123
Justice Stevens, author of the Kelo majority opinion, admitted he based his ruling
on an “embarrassing to acknowledge” misunderstanding of precedent and that it
earned the status of the “most unpopular opinion” he ever wrote.124 Kelo’s
attorney Dana Berliner claimed that evidence showed, at the time of the decision,
that the redevelopment plan would never come into fruition, but the courts
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ignored this evidence.125 Similarly, the Midkiff ruling resulted in Japanese
investors purchasing the newly available land as vacation homes, which resulted
in a “dramatic increase, not a decrease, in home prices,” contrary to the public
purpose justification of breaking up the land oligopoly.126
Ordinary Americans particularly reviled the Kelo decision. Following
the Kelo decision, polls indicated that eighty percent of Americans across all
political, ideological, and racial lines were opposed to the ruling, as one
commentator put it, “[t]his is one of the rare issues where Ralph Nader, Rush
Limbaugh, and the NAACP were all on the same side.”127 Another poll showed
that eighty-nine percent of people opposed the use of eminent domain for
economic development, leading the pollster to say that he had never seen such a
lopsided result in his career.128 This consensus is a product of private property
rights being perceived as a fundamental ideal in American life and culture.
The Kelo holding de facto constitutionalized trickle-down economics,
where the economic development is hypothesized to “trickle down in the form
of increased tax revenues and wages” and confer a “public benefit” for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment.129 Michael Kinsey described the decision as the Court
declaring “that yuppification is a valid public purpose.”130 A Kelo analysis
requires the Court to surrender its power in deciding whether an economic
development plan constitutes a public purpose, while giving unfettered discretion
to municipal agencies benefitting from private for-profit developers, so long as
any decision they make is “conceivably rational.”131 The Court relegated this
profound constitutional question to state legislatures and local, unelected, and
unaccountable condemning bodies.132 The local agencies with this newfound
authority often do not grasp the law, serve for-profit private interests, and have
no incentive to pursue the public interest, leaving the Court little to do besides
approve and legitimize the agency’s decision.133
On the other hand, members of the ruling class championed the Kelo
decision. The editorial boards of both the New York Times and Washington Post
endorsed the decision on the exact same day.134 Nancy Pelosi described the ruling
125
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as, “almost as if God had spoken.”135 Indianapolis Mayor Bart Peterson and
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky described the ruling as merely affirming the status
quo.136 Professor Chemerinsky blamed the public backlash of Kelo on the
public’s misunderstanding of the ruling and the way the media framed the
decision.137 Remember, Justice Stevens himself admitted his ruling was based on
a misunderstanding of the law. The Brookings Institution described the ruling as
promoting “holistic redevelopment.”138 Professor Richard Lazarus cynically
described the backlash as an “extraordinary PR job by the property rights
movement.”139
Kelo did not merely “affirm the status quo”; rather, it abandoned the
once-limited circumstances in which eminent domain could be used to eliminate
serious social and public harms, and only incidentally benefitted private
parties.140 Moreover, a century of jurisprudence preceded Kelo, with no case
articulating the ultimate broad Kelo standard, and it is doubtful a “reaffirmation
of the status quo” would lead to such a divisive split in the Kelo ruling.141 The
Court’s ruling had the Orwellian effect of declaring public is private and use is
purpose, and a taking from private party A to private party B is not actually a
taking from private party A to private party B.142 All that is required under the
Kelo standard, or lack thereof, is that the plan has some conceivable rational basis
and is not arbitrary.143 All businesses create plans and all economic development
agencies create plans, thus it is simple to recite some economic plan that could
satisfy the “standard.”144 On the other hand, when deciding whether to award a
business compensation for losses suffered due to eminent domain, courts apply
a stricter standard which requires that the losses must be “reliably valued,” rather
than simply reasonably valued, even if the business has been operating in the
location for years.145

V. KELO AND THE GAMING INDUSTRY
The Kelo ruling profoundly affected the gaming industry. Many states
incorporate language expressly mentioning “general welfare,” “general public,”
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and “economic development,” among other problematic post-Kelo language,
directly into gaming statutes. The entire basis for state legalization of gaming is
often to incentivize economic development. New casino resorts and markets
bring promises of tax revenue, jobs, and tourism, often to economically
distressed areas.
Nevada declared that “[t]he gaming industry is vitally important to the
economy of the State and the general welfare of the inhabitants.”146 Additionally,
Nevada mandates that “all gaming establishments . . . must remain open to the
general public.”147 The protection of the gaming industry in Nevada has been
described as a compelling interest because it supports the state’s entire
economy.148 Massachusetts expressly declared its fundamental gaming policy
objectives as creating employment opportunities by “promoting local small
businesses and the tourism industry, including the development of new and
existing small business and tourism entities,” and promoting the state’s “unique
cultural and social resources.”149 Similarly, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Illinois all made express declarations of economic development as a critical
public policy behind their gaming enactments.150 The New Jersey legislature
even described the gaming industry as a “critically important and valuable asset
in the continued viability and economic strength of New Jersey” and expressly
stated the economic stability of gaming is “in the public interest.”151
Moreover, gaming can constitute a key component of a state’s tax
revenue. Massachusetts received an additional $600 million in tax revenue due
to the legalization of gaming in 2011.152 Although this is a small portion of
Massachusetts’s overall tax revenue, it is an important source of funding for
education, local aid, and economic development, among a variety of other
uses.153 In 2018, Nevada’s gaming industry created an economic impact of $67.6
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billion.154 The gaming and tourism industry employed more than a quarter of
Nevadans and generated taxes representing 37.5% of Nevada’s general fund
revenue.155
Clearly, there is troubling language in these statutes if one owns a piece
of land that a gaming company has its eyes on in the post-Kelo world. The
statutes themselves often make the express legislative determination of public
use necessary in the Kelo context. In these cases, the condemning agency needs
only to point at the language of the statute as justification for its taking.
Furthermore, gaming-related taxes represent a key component for state and local
economies and tax revenues, commingling the public and state’s interests with
private interests.
Following Kelo, the legislature in thirty-eight states passed laws to
restrict the broad eminent domain power created by the Supreme Court, which
could potentially minimize the consequences of the gaming statutes’ language.
These laws were ultimately enacted in thirty-seven of these states.156
Additionally, four more states enacted laws via popular vote, bringing the total
to forty-one states that responded to the “perceived injustice” of Kelo, signifying
a “national backlash of support for property rights.”157 Some states banned the
exercise of eminent domain for economic development altogether, while others,
such as Florida and Georgia, narrowly defined public use or blight.158 However,
of the thirty-seven states that enacted laws through the legislative process, only
twenty-three states passed meaningful reform, whereas fourteen states passed
weak or symbolic laws.159 These symbolic laws impose weak restrictions, retain
broad deference to local legislatures, or create “loopholes, exemptions, and
vague definitions of public use or blight.”160 State legislatures found themselves
confronting powerful interests who supported the status quo, thus these fourteen
states passed symbolic measures to quell an angry populace, while leaving the
substantive eminent domain law intact.161
Many state legislatures responded to the Kelo backlash, but only in the
sense that they passed a law, whether a state passed meaningful reform depended
on the political and economic situations within each state.162 States with higher
rates of inequality were more likely to enact either a largely symbolic law or no
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new law at all.163 For example, New York and New Jersey, which have high
racial and income inequality, did not pass any legislation in response to Kelo and
are unlikely to do so in the future.164 In 2009, the New York Court of Appeals
heard a controversial economic development takings case and possessed the
opportunity to implement meaningful changes. Although the state’s high court
determined the subject property did not suffer from severe blight, it found
judicial interference of the private condemning body’s determination was not
appropriate if there is room for “reasonable difference of opinion.”165
On the other hand, states where public backlash was spurred due to
frequent private-to-private takings, and states with a history of economic liberty
were more likely to pass meaningful laws in response to Kelo.166 The laws were
nearly entirely the product of grassroots movements.167 The strongest predictor
of meaningful eminent domain reform was the value of new housing, with a
booming construction market either creating a strong home builder influence or
being an indicator of economic growth, incentivizing states to respond to Kelo
meaningfully by not impeding continued growth.168
The Illinois General Assembly passed Senate Bill 3086 (2006), an
attempt to limit the state’s eminent domain power.169 However, the bill was
criticized as creating so many exceptions that it effectively undermined any
meaningful restriction on private-to-private takings.170 The bill permitted
exercise of eminent domain for blighted properties so long as a vague and
illogical list of factors which “represented some of the worse examples in law”
were met.171 Some of these factors included “deleterious layouts” or “excessive
vacancies” as grounds for takings.172 Moreover, the bill still allowed for private
takings so long as economic development served as a secondary purpose to a
primary purpose of urban renewal.173 Additionally, the law still allowed for the
designation of entire areas as “blighted” due to the condition of a few properties
in the area.174 Senate Bill 3086 is an example of symbolic reform still managing
to fail.
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In 2013, Illinois passed a gaming bill which sought to amend the Illinois
Eminent Domain Act by a 32-20 margin.175 The bill stated, in pertinent part, “the
City [of Chicago] may acquire, by eminent domain or by condemnation
proceedings . . . real or personal property or interests in . . . property located in
the City, and the City may convey to the [Chicago Casino Development]
Authority property so acquired. The acquisition of property under this Section is
declared to be for a public use.”176
Clearly, this bill would vastly expand the takings power for the gaming
industry in Illinois. This amendment would grant unbridled power to the Chicago
Casino Development Authority for taking real and personal property for the use
of gaming development. The bill even made a preemptive determination of
public use within its own text.177 There is not even a requirement for a finding of
blight or a requirement for economic development to be a secondary purpose.178
Although the Senate decisively passed the bill, for now it was effectively killed
by adjournment.179 However, this may not have stopped the exercise of eminent
domain to make room for casinos in Illinois. In 2020, the Illinois Department of
Transportation (“IDOT”) sought to seize twelve feet of private property for a
“bike path” through an industrial area seldomly traveled and suspiciously near a
proposed casino site.180 IDOT refused to comment about whether the potential
casino factored into its decision.181
On the other hand, Nevada passed one of the strongest and most
meaningful eminent domain reforms in what is known as the “Property Owner’s
Bill of Rights.”182 When Kelo was decided, the biennial Nevada State Legislature
was not in session, so Nevada’s citizens proposed a ballot initiative which
contained “both a prohibition on private-to-private transfers and controversial
takings language.”183 A court challenge removed the latter portion from the
initiative because it violated the single-subject requirement under NRS
section 295.009, a requirement intended to prevent confusion and promote
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informed decisions.184 Consequently, the initiative became framed as purely a
public use issue, expressly forbidding direct and indirect private takings and
placing the burden on the government to prove public use.185
As a result of this amendment, there is a much greater burden on the
government seeking to take land through eminent domain. The amendment also
eliminated all private-to-private takings.186 Moreover, the amendment
guarantees appraisal at the highest and best use, with guaranteed compensation
to put the property owner at least back at the same position had the property not
been taken at all.187 Alternatively, if the fair market value is applied, the property
owner would be entitled to the highest price the property would be sold for on an
open market.188 Property owners can challenge the government’s appraisals and
elect for a sympathetic jury to determine whether the taking is actually for public
use.189 Additionally, if a property is taken, then after five years of nonuse it will
revert to the original property owner.190
Nevada’s constitution requires a proposed constitutional amendment to
be approved in either two successive elections or to pass in the state legislature
and a general election. Nevada voters passed the initiative by a twenty-six
percent margin in 2006 and a twenty-one percent margin in 2008, which led to
the ratification of the initiative into the state constitution. 191 Nevada voters
soundly rejected a competing initiative, which contained significantly weaker
language, by a thirty-five percent margin in 2010.192 Accordingly, enshrined in
the Nevada Constitution’s Declaration of Rights is an outright prohibition on
private-to-private takings and an onerous burden for the government to establish
public use. Pennsylvania, a state with a long history of eminent domain abuse,
passed a similar measure known as the “Property Rights Protection Act” with
“near-unanimous support in the General Assembly,” which significantly
narrowed the state’s definition of “blight” and prohibited private-to-private
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takings.193 Despite their troubled past with eminent domain abuses, Pennsylvania
and Nevada passed meaningful reform measures that should prevent future
takings of private property for gaming properties.
By contrast, Massachusetts failed to enact any eminent domain reform
at the state level and eminent domain abuses remain prevalent throughout the
state.194 Massachusetts gave the City of Everett permission to exercise their
eminent domain power on private property for the construction of the $2.4billion Wynn Boston Harbor project.195 Massachusetts permitted the City to seize
up to nine parcels for the casino.196 Even McDonald’s could not successfully
challenge this awesome power and was subjected to a potential taking. 197
Everett’s planning director justified the proposed taking because “[t]he
Wynn project will help accelerate future redevelopment throughout the
neighborhood.”198 Wynn spokesman Michael Weaver stated eminent domain
may be necessary “to create a new area of economic development, of which our
project will be the centerpiece and a catalyst.”199 Paul McMorrow, the governor’s
housing and economic development director, stated the plan encouraged
economic growth and development.200 However, one Everett resident believed,
“[i]t would cast fear in me as a small business owner to consider buying or
opening a property in Everett if I knew that it could be seized for what they
consider to be a better opportunity.”201 Ultimately, the City of Everett decided to
only use eminent domain as a last resort and never actually exercised the
power.202 Wynn spent $19.5 million purchasing residential, commercial, and
industrial properties well above market price voluntarily from homeowners and
landlords, and sometimes involuntarily from tenants.203
Although Wynn never exercised eminent domain, the possibility clearly
remains for future lucrative gaming resorts. In late 2021, the City of Everett once

193

CASTLE COALITION, supra note 169, at 42.
Id. at 25.
195
Jon Chesto, State Gives Everett the Power to Seize Parcels
Near Casino Site, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 18, 2015, 9:16 PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/09/18/state-gives-everett-officialspower-seize-parcels-near-casino-site/WElGDI4p0DbHGIlM66KZyI/story.html;
Mark Micheli, Why is Steve Wynn Spending Millions on These
Everett
Homes,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Mar.
30,
2017,
7:35
PM),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/north/2017/03/30/wynn-casinorises-nearby-neighborhood-facesdemolition/6neLAa03dOIEjYjENauYWM/story.html.
196
Chesto, supra note 195.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Micheli, supra note 195.
194

BEAL

Spring 2022]

5/11/2022 7:04 PM

EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE GAMING INDUSTRY

337

again approved the use of eminent domain for properties surrounding Wynn’s
Boston Harbor.204 Although the City stated it simply wished the approval would
spur a private sale, the City is clearly comfortable with using the coercive threat
of eminent domain to achieve what it wants.205
New Jersey is particularly in need of reform and has seen some of the
most egregious abuses of eminent domain.206 The standard for economic
development is “so broad that most every New Jersey property is subject to
acquisition.”207 Under New Jersey law, “‘lack of proper utilization’ that leads to
‘stagnant or not fully productive’ use of the land” constitutes “blighted”
property.208 This broad definition could mean any piece of property that is not
maximizing production potential is blighted, which would include virtually every
single residential home and most businesses, as a nice Amazon warehouse would
certainly be more productive than Mom and Pop’s Diner. The standard of proper
utilization is similarly ambiguous, as it seemingly requires property in New
Jersey to optimize all possible utilization. A cynic may view this ambiguous
language as a license for agencies to use their own interpretations to clear up this
ambiguity and condemn any property they choose.
One particularly famous pre-Kelo story of eminent domain involved a
casino development, a woman named Vera Coking, and a real estate developer
named Donald Trump.209 The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority
(“CRDA”) threatened to take Ms. Coking’s Atlantic City home to make room
for a limousine parking lot for Donald Trump’s Plaza Hotel and Casino.210
Coking refused to sell her house and instead commenced a lengthy legal battle,
with a New Jersey court ultimately ruling in her favor and ending the CRDA’s
attempt to take her house.211 Ironically, Ms. Coking’s home outlived Trump’s
presence in Atlantic City, as Trump eventually sued to have his name removed
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from the dilapidated and blighted casino.212 In 2021, the casino was
demolished.213 Vera Coking is a great example of the shortsightedness of many
economic development plans. Developers are willing to take a homeowner’s
property for promises of revenue and jobs, but many times these plans never bear
fruit.
New Jersey gives the CRDA the power to exercise eminent domain to
complete economic projects in Atlantic City, which includes takings to
encourage economic development.214 The CRDA helped develop some public
works but primarily seized property for “public-private partnership activities” to
create jobs and increase property values.215 In 2012, the CRDA restarted an
economic development plan, with Revel Casino using gaming tax revenue from
its proposed casino project to fund the stagnant project.216 One of the targeted
properties belonged to Charles Birnbaum and a home where he grew up, ran his
piano business, and maintained a memorial for his parents.217 After negotiations
failed, the CRDA simply went to the court and requested authority to take the
property.218 After initially allowing the project to proceed, Revel Casino went
bankrupt and the trial court found for Birnbaum.219
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s
ruling that a taking required a more specific plan than merely stockpiling
potentially useful land.220 Moreover, without elucidating a new standard, the
New Jersey high court recognized the need for the legislature and judiciary to
scrutinize economic development takings.221 Revel, ironically known as the
“Casino the State Saved,” was a spectacular $2.4-billion failure.222 Deborah
Howlett, the president of New Jersey Policy Perspective, prophetically—or
perhaps not so prophetically—stated, “[t]here was a reason that the private sector
212
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wasn’t stepping up. If they believed there was an opportunity to make money,
they would have funded this.”223
Tribal casinos also commonly exercise eminent domain. The Federated
Indians of Graton Rancheria exercised eminent domain for a road-widening
project for easier access to their $800-million Graton Resort Hotel and Casino
project.224 Outraged, a landowner said, “This is not about the money . . . you
can’t just take someone’s property . . . . How would the city feel if I did an
eminent domain of their kitchens so that I can have dinner tonight?”225 Despite
the divisive project, the City identified a “public interest” and moved forward
with the exercise of eminent domain.226

VI. SOLUTIONS
The United States Supreme Court’s abrogation of deciding a federal
constitutional issue to the states has had mixed success. Most states passed some
kind of reform, although nearly half of these measures were merely symbolic or
weak. State constitutional amendments, particularly those created by grassroot
citizen movements such as Nevada’s, are the strongest line of protection against
eminent domain abuse and misuse. Constitutional amendments are not as easily
overturned as acts by the legislature or judicial precedent. Moreover,
constitutional amendments, such as Nevada’s, create a clear standard and heavy
burden that the government must satisfy to justify a taking. This amendment
takes away a lot of the guesswork and judicial discretion that leaves eminent
domain such a vague and all-encompassing area of law. Additionally, it
guarantees fair compensation for a taking, rather than the pennies on the dollar
that property owners often receive.
State legislatures may also provide some relief, but their interests often
conflict with their citizens’ interests, as seen in Illinois’ attempt to grant near
plenary power to the gaming agency to exercise eminent domain. New Jersey’s
answer to the post-Kelo eminent domain power so far has been within the
judiciary. The New Jersey Superior Court even recognized the need for greater
judicial scrutiny for takings. However, the judiciary seems unwilling to grant
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more protection from takings. Nicholas Casiello Jr., one of the world’s leading
gaming attorneys, described the natural political process as the solution for
eminent domain abuses.227 Mr. Casiello described eminent domain as being a
volatile exercise of government power and causes substantial blowback when
exercised, disincentivizing its use.228 The CRDA are political appointees, thus
Atlantic City politicians and the CRDA are hesitant to exercise eminent domain
because they do not want to lose votes and fear political repercussions. 229
For a time, it appeared the Supreme Court would revisit Kelo and
eminent domain in its October 2021 session. Fred Eychaner challenged
Chicago’s exercise of eminent domain on his non-blighted property.230 The
Illinois high court held the city could use eminent domain to prevent speculative
future blight and that “[r]ecognizing the difference between a valid public use
and a sham can be challenging.”231
On July 2, 2021, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari.232 Justices Kavanaugh, Thomas, and Gorsuch indicated they wished to
grant the writ.233 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch provided a written dissent, first
arguing that Kelo was wrong when it was decided and continues to be wrong.234
Next, they argued that Kelo cited authority which not only undermined its own
holding but also established the use of eminent domain to avert future blight as
violating the Public Use Clause.235 The dissent recognized the Court’s duty to
prevent lower courts from “further dismantl[ing] constitutional safeguards” and
the taking at issue was the quintessential large corporation using the coercive
power of the state to seize property of a relatively weak private citizen, as Justice
O’Connor warned in her Kelo dissent.236
Nonetheless, eminent domain is an issue the United States Supreme
Court should revisit. Eminent domain disparately impacts the “discrete and
insular” minorities that a famous footnote once swore to protect. Moreover,
eminent domain abuses have been described as an “urban ethnic cleansing,”
where the politically disadvantaged and vulnerable are removed from their
homes to make room for more lucrative opportunities with the backing of
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immensely politically and economically powerful interests.237 Private takings are
antithetical to the nation’s founding ideals. The United States was founded on a
reverence for private property. In fact, this country just ended a nearly centurylong ideological war around the appropriate respect for private property. Eminent
domain is a tool for the government to take property for public infrastructure
projects for the greater good of the country as a whole. The definition of public
use has eroded to the point where it encompasses taking an individual’s home to
make room for a more lucrative economic project that primarily benefits private
interests and only incidentally benefits the public through tax revenue or job
creation.
Moreover, the free market is a more appropriate tool for acquiring land
intended for resorts, as shown by the Boston Harbor project. Redevelopment
agencies and local legislatures are often blinded with siren songs of jobs and tax
revenue, thus they exercise the nuclear option of eminent domain and try to force
doomed development plans. If a project is viable, the free market will step in and
property owners will typically sell if the offered sum is high enough, which it
usually will be if the planned project is economically viable. If the owner does
not wish to sell, then that is their right. Instead, these local agencies use force to
implement economic development projects and often wind up with total
economic loss.
Recently, there has been a growing chorus that property rights should be
elevated to the status of a fundamental right and a strict scrutiny analysis should
be conducted when property is taken through eminent domain.238 In fact, the
Supreme Court recognizes the sanctity of the home to justify heightened scrutiny
for laws infringing on liberties such as sexual liberty or unreasonable searches. 239
It is an oddity that the sanctity of a home is worthy of heightened scrutiny for
some purposes, but the desecration of this sanctity through forcible removal and
even its destruction only warrants rational basis review, the lowest level of
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court’s abrogation of its duty to protect constitutional
rights and its unfettered deference to local legislatures and condemning bodies is
wholly indefensible. The condemning bodies are unelected and unaccountable,
which undercuts the argument for letting the political process handle it.
Additionally, local legislatures suffer from short-sightedness and are often
influenced by powerful interests at the expense of their citizens’ interests. For a
237
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country that prides itself on respect for private property rights and recognizes the
unique sanctity of the home, takings should be subject to the highest level of
judicial scrutiny.

